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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NORMA CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 16337 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMNISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Norma Clark is seeking review of a final 
order of the Utah State Industrial Commission awarding her 
workmen's compensation benefits on the basis of 30% permanent 
partial disability. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On November 3, 1977, plaintiff Norma Clark filed 
an application for workmen's compensation benefits with 
the Utah State Industrial Commission. Her claim was the 
subject of a formal hearing held on February 28, 1978 
before Administrative Law Judge Keith E. Sohm. The medical 
aspects of the case were referred to a medical panel, the 
report of which was received on May 5, 1978. A further 
hearing was held on the plaintiff's objections to the medical 
panel report on August 11, 1978. 
The Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on August 23, 1978. 
Following a timely Motion for Review by the plaintff, the 
Industrial Commission as a whole granted the Motion and entered I 
order on January 3, 1979, increasing the plain tiff's 
1 
It is this Order of which the plaintiff seeks review. 
an amended 
award. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Defendants respectfully request that the Order of 
the Industrial Commission be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Norma Clark suffered an injury by accident in the 
course of her employment with Interstate Homes, Inc., on 
March 3, 1977. The State Insurance Fund, as the workmen's 
compensation insurance carrier for the plaintiff's employer, 
accepted liability for the accident and paid Hrs. Clark 
temporary total disability compensation until Janaury 11, 1978, 
in the amount of $4,916.17. The Fund also paid the plaintiff's 
medical expenses during that period, in the amount of $7,807. 74. 
The plaintiff was treated by numerous physicians 
for her back and leg difficulties. She underwent surgery 
in June of 1977, but did not gain relief from her pain. 
No treating physician could find any objective evidence of 
the physiological source of Ms. Clark's pain, and Dr. F. 
Jackson Millet reported that she could return to lighter 
duty work on October 25, 1977. (R. 42) 
In an effort to resolve the question regarding the 
extent of the plaintiff's permanent disability, her case 
was brought to hearing and submitted to a medical panel. 
The panel found that she was suffering from a twenty (20) 
-2-
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per cent loss of bodily function which would be permanent. 
(R. 219). The plaintiff objected to this finding and at the 
hearing held on her objections Dr. Robert Lamb testified that 
he had recently discovered the apparent source of Ms. Clark's 
continuing pain. He indicated that he had diagnosed a 
condition known as adhesive arachnoiditis. (R. 185) He 
further indicated that he felt her disability rating should 
be more appropriately set as thirty-five (35) per cent. Dr. 
Lamb also testified that the plaintiff was physically able 
to return to many types of employment. (R. 189) 
There was no disagreement between the two doctors 
concerning Ms. Clark's symptomology, but Dr. Lamb felt the 
objective finding of arachnoiditis justified a higher 
rating because it gave strong credence to the pain reported 
by the plaintiff. He did admit that he would agree with a 
twenty (20) per cent permanent impairment rating absent the 
finding of arachnoiditis. (R. 200) 
The Administrative Law Judge found the applicant 
twenty-five (25) percent permanently disabled, and the 
Commission as a whole increased this figure to thirty (30) 
per cent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS 
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The plaintiff is seeking review of the Industrial 
Commission's determination regarding the extent of her permanent 
disability. It is fundamental that a determination of perma-
nent disability is a factual question which is within the 
exclusive perogative of the Commission to resolve, and will not be 
-3-
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set aside on review unless there is no substantial evidence in 
( 
the record upon which it can be supported. 
( 
See Evans v. In~ 
Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d 324, 502 P.2d 118 (1972); Wilstead v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 214, 407 P.2d 692 (1965); Utah 
Code Ann. ~ 35-1-85 (1953). 
In the instant case the plaintiff is claiming to 
be permanently and totally disabled because she is unable to 
return to her former employment. It is settled law in Ut~ 
that an injured worker is not totally disabled solely because 
of an inability to return to the same type of employment 
enjoyed prior to the injury. In Wi ls tead v. Indus trial Comm'n, 
supra, this Court stated that 
Compensation during total disability does not 
necessarily mean until the employee is able to 
do his former work. If this were so, where there 
is the loss of a hand, or a foot, or other 
permanent partial disablement, the period of 
total disability could be indefinite because 
he may never be able to do the same work again. 
The fact that when plaintiff's doctors released 
him for work he was unable to reobtain his former 
job is no reason for concluding that his condition 
of total disability continued until he could do so. 
17 Utah 2d at 217. 
The plaintiff's own physician testified that she 
was physically able to be employed (R. 189) and the Commission 
accepted that opinion. Further, the percentage of disability 
found by the Commission does not justify a determination that 
the plaintiff is now permanently and totally disabled. 
In Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 92 
Utah 511, 69 P.2d 608 (1937), this Court noted that our 
compensation system is designed to compensate for loss of 
bodily function or permanent physical impairment, not 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' 
I 
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economic or industrial disability. 
The compensation for permanent partial disability 
is measured either by the schedule or in proportion 
thereto and as deemed equitable on the loss of 
bodily functions alone, ... But if the appl~cant 
cla~ms total and permanent disability the issue 
is as to whether he is totally and permanently 
disabled industriaLly and economically. There is 
a twilight zone where one blends into the other. 
That is, the loss of bodily fuction may be so 
great as to leave one totally and permanentally 
disabled industrially. Thus a person with a 90 
per cent loss of bodily fuction might be able to 
prove himself totally and permanently disabled. 
If so, he would take himself out of the class of 
applicants limited to recover (for permanent loss 
of bodily function) and put himself in the 
class where his compensation should be determined 
by his total lack of industrial or economical 
ability. But until that oint is reached, the 
permanent part~a ~sa ~ ~ty ~s seem~ng y compensated 
for on loss of bodily function alone . . . 
69 P.2d at 613. 
In that case, the Court refused to set aside of 
a finding that an applicant who was seventy (70) per cent 
impaired was not totally disabled. The plaintiff's impairment 
in the instant case does not approximate a rating of such 
severity as to present a question concerning her ability to 
find some form of employment, and the only medical testimony 
concerning her physical ability to work was to the effect 
that she could. 
In Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 
P.2d 321 (1943), an applicant with a 25-30% permanent 
impairment sought reivew of the denial of the Commission to 
find him permanently and totally disabled. The Court found 
that based upon the rating and the testimony of the physicians 
that there were types of work the employee could perform, such a 
denial was not unreasonable. These are essentially the same 
-5-
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facts as presented by the instant case, and appellant would 
assert that there is nothing contained in the record to 
demand a different result in this case. 
The record is totally devoid of any evidence 
reflecting on the applicant's inability to perform work 
other than manual labor, except for her own assertion that she 
didn't think she could handle a "desk" job "because I like to 
be on the move." (R. 204) 
In short, there is no evidence to justify a finding 
of permanent and total disability. Indeed, the evidence 
I presented was that the plaintiff was at most 35/, disabled and W!' 
capable of returning to work. 
The plaintiff's contention that the Commission was 
bound to accept Dr. Lamb's 35%, disability rating, instead 
of the 30% found by the Commission, is equally erroneous. Dr, 
Holbrook testified that at the time of his examination Ms. 
Clark had a 20% loss of bodily function. (R. 219) Dr. Lamb 
i 
indicated that, although her symptoms didn't change, Ms. Clark 1 
I 
was determined to have adhesive arachnoiditis subsequent to 
Dr. Holbrook's examination. Based upon this finding, Dr. 
Lamb gave his 35% disability rating. It is important to note 1 
that, if anything, Ms. Clark's physical impairment was ~ 
by this discovery, as it made her treatment more effective. 
(R. 197-98) Her symptoms and limitations were the same as 
when she was examined by Dr. Holbrook, and the only change 
was an objective finding which gave greater credence to her 
reports of pain. The difficult question presented to the 
Commission, therefore, was how to resolve the difference in 
-6-
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the two opinions of the physicians. It should be noted that 
neither physician expressly disagreed with the rating of the 
other (R. 200 and 194), becuase, in Dr. Holbrook's words 
Pain is really not very measurable, even experi-
mentally. And what one person might find as 
evaluation in a patient where the main problem 
is pain, there may be much greater variation from 
one examiner to another, than for example if it's 
an amputation. That's the same to everybody. But 
the interpretation of an examiner, based on the 
main problem of pain, is going to vary. Of 
course there is more supporting evidence now of the 
degree of pain that she has than we had evidence 
of at the time that I saw her. (R. 195) 
Given the fact that the discovery of arachnoiditis 
gave objective support for the subjective pain of the 
applicant, the Commission increased the rating suggested by 
Dr. Holbrook by 10%, but didn't conclude that his unwilling-
ness to disagree with Dr. Lamb's report without doing futher 
tests and examining the evidence of arachnoiditis meant he 
would be in full agreement with that rating had those tests 
been performed. (R. 244) This resolution of the issue 
recognizes that the symptoms underlying the disability were 
unchanged, or possible improved, from the time of Dr. Holbrook's 
original examination. 
It has been previously noted that in arriving at a 
disability rating the Industrial Commission is not bound to 
accept expert medical opinion on the subject, but can base its 
determination on the record as a whole. Silver King Coalition 
Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra. The defendant submits 
that the Commission resolved the conflict in the testimony in 
harmony with the evidence and should be sustained on review. 
Finally, the plaintiff complains of the refusal of 
-7-
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the Commission to order the Fund to pay for the applicant's 
attendance at a weight loss clinic. As authority for her 
contention that such an expense should be borne by the defend· I 
ants, plaintiff asserts that it is covered by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-81 (1953), which provides, in relevant part, that 
In addition to the compensation provided for in 
this title the employer or insurance carrier, or the 
commission of finance out of the state insurance 
fund, shall in ordinary cases also be required 
to pay such reasonable sum for medical, nurse and 
hospital services, and for medicines, and for such 
artificial means and applicances as may be necessary I 
to treat the patient as in the judgment of the ! 
industrial commission may be just . 
The simple answer to this assertion is that the 
award requested is not for "medical, nurse (or) hospital 
services" and even if it was, the Commission found that it 
would not be "just" to impose such costs on the defendants as 
there was nothing in the record to show that the plaintiff's 
weight problem was proximately caused by her industrial 
accident. (R. 255) 
Any number of optional programs can have a theraputic, 
affect on injured employees, as evidenced by the numerous 
requests submitted to the State Insurance Fund for construction 
of in-home Jaccuzzi pools, but the statutory scheme of 
compensation obligates the employer to pay for only those 
services which are "necessary" to treat for the industrial 
injury. There is nothing in the record to suggest that 
the expense of the weight loss program is "necessary" or 
that it was brought about by the accident. The Commission's 
Order denying that portion of the claim is neither unreasonablE 
nor arbitrary. 
-8-
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CONCLUSION 
Norma Clark's industrial injury resulted in a loss 
of bodily function which was primarily a result of back pain. 
While her treating physician admitted she could return to 
some type of employment, he felt she was 35% disabled. 
The defendants' submit that the Commission's finding that 
t~. Clark was 30% disabled, when viewed in light of Dr. 
Holbrook's rating of a 20% impairment based on essentially the 
same symptoms, is an entirely reasonable resolution of the 
difficult proposition involved in rating impairments due to 
subjective symptoms such as pain. As there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that Ms. Clark isn't capable of returning 
to gainful employment, the defendants request that the 
Commission's action be affirmed. 
DATED this _____ day of June, 1979. 
BLACK & MOORE 
M. DAVID ECKERSLEY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this ____ day of June, 1979, I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing Brief to Mikel M. Boley, 3535 South 3200 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119. 
Secretary 
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